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Abstract
The authors show that the widening of a foreign ﬁrm’s U.S. investor base and the improved
information environment associated with cross-listing on a U.S. exchange each have a separately
identiﬁable effect on a ﬁrm’s valuation. The increase in valuation associated with cross-listing is
transitory, not permanent. Valuations of Canadian ﬁrms peak in the year of cross-listing and fall
monotonically thereafter, regardless of the level of U.S. investor holdings or the ownership
structure of the ﬁrm. Cross-listed ﬁrms with a 20 per cent or more blockholder attract a similar
number of U.S. institutional investors as widely held ﬁrms, on average, but experience a lower
increase in valuation at high levels of investor recognition. While U.S. investors are less willing to
invest in ﬁrms with dual-class shares, these ﬁrms beneﬁt more from cross-listing even when they
fail to widen their U.S. investor base, suggesting that the reduction in information asymmetry
between controlling and minority investors has a separate impact on valuation for ﬁrms where
agency problems are greatest.
JEL classiﬁcation: G12, G15
Bank classiﬁcation: Financial markets; International topics
Résumé
Les auteurs montrent que la hausse de la participation des investisseurs américains au capital
d’une entreprise étrangère et l’amélioration de l’information disponible sur celle-ci après son
inscription à une bourse des États-Unis ont sur la valeur de ses actions des effets discernables l’un
de l’autre. L’appréciation qu’enregistrent les titres d’entreprises canadiennes nouvellement
intercotées est passagère. Leur cours culmine en effet durant l’année qui suit, puis il diminue de
façon monotone, peu importe le niveau de participation des investisseurs américains au capital ou
la structure de l’actionnariat de l’entreprise. Les sociétés intercotées contrôlées par un actionnaire
dominant qui possède au moins 20 % du capital-actions attirent en moyenne autant d’investisseurs
institutionnels aux États-Unis que celles dont la propriété est plus dispersée, mais leur titre
s’apprécie moins lorsqu’elles sont déjà bien connues des investisseurs. S’il est vrai que les
investisseurs américains hésitent davantage à investir dans les entreprises émettant deux
catégories d’actions, il reste que ces entreprises tirent plus de bénéﬁces de l’intercotation même
quand elles ne parviennent pas à élargir leur actionnariat aux États-Unis. Ce résultat donne à
penser que la réduction de l’asymétrie d’information entre l’actionnaire dominant et les
actionnaires minoritaires a un effet distinct sur la valeur de l’action là où le conﬂit d’intérêts entre
les deux types d’actionnaire est le plus grand.
Classiﬁcation JEL : G12, G15
Classiﬁcation de la Banque : Marchés ﬁnanciers; Questions internationales1 
1.  Introduction  
The literature on cross-listing documents a number of benefits to listing on a foreign stock 
exchange—benefits that are now seen as the conventional wisdom (Karolyi 2006). Foreign firms 
that cross-list in the United States have higher valuations, a lower cost of capital, and increased 
liquidity. Foerster and Karolyi (1999) and Baker, Nofsinger, and Weaver (2002) attribute part of 
the increase in a cross-listed firm’s valuation to the broadening of its U.S. investor base and the 
greater visibility of the firm, as predicted by Merton’s (1987) investor recognition hypothesis. 
Merton develops a capital-asset-pricing model under incomplete information where an increase 
in the number of investors aware of a firm lowers the expected returns on the firm’s stock, 
resulting in a contemporaneous increase in valuation. This theory provides an incentive for 
foreign firms that are either neglected or have a low number of investors to cross-list on a  
U.S. stock exchange if this action would increase their overall shareholder base. Indeed, surveys 
of managers confirm that one of the reasons behind their decision to cross-list is to broaden their 
shareholder base by attracting U.S. investors (Mittoo 1992; Fanto and Karmel 1997; and Bancel 
and Mittoo 2001).  
While Foerster and Karolyi (1999) and Baker, Nofsinger, and Weaver (2002) link increased 
investor recognition with higher valuations at the time of cross-listing, these studies do not 
address whether the impact on valuation is transitory or permanent. They also do not address 
how the investor recognition effect varies cross-sectionally based on firm characteristics. In 
particular, ownership structure has been shown to influence the decision of U.S. investors to 
purchase a foreign stock. A large literature following Jensen and Meckling (1976) highlights 
how agency problems between controlling and minority shareholders lead to greater information 
asymmetry and lower valuations of closely  held firms.
1 Concentrated ownership affects the 
willingness of U.S. investors to buy a foreign stock. Edison and Warnock (2004), Leuz, Lins, 
and Warnock (2005), and Ferreira and Matos (2006) find that U.S. institutional investors avoid 
foreign firms controlled by a large blockholder, particularly where owners use dual-class shares 
to separate cash-flow rights from control rights. These studies suggest that a firm’s ownership 
structure may condition the benefits of increased investor recognition following cross-listing.  
This paper makes three contributions to the literature. First, we show cross-sectionally that the 
magnitude of the increase in valuation at the time of cross-listing is conditional on the widening 
                                                 
1 Morck, Wolfenzon, and Yeung (2005) summarize this literature. Studies by Claessens et al. (2002), Lins 
(2003), Lemmon and Lins (2003), and Doidge et al. (2006) link information asymmetry between 
controlling and minority shareholders with lower valuations of closely held firms. 2 
of the firm’s U.S. shareholder base. Using a 16-year panel of 277 Canadian firms listed on  
U.S. stock exchanges between 1989 and 2004, we show that those firms that attract the most 
U.S. investors at the time of cross-listing experience the greatest increase in valuation from this 
event. This relationship is robust when controlling for firm characteristics such as size, growth 
opportunities, profitability, leverage, visibility in the home market, and liquidity. Not all firms, 
however, benefit from increased investor recognition following a U.S. listing. Firms that attract 
few or no U.S. investors do not experience an increase in valuation and are valued similarly to 
non-cross-listed firms.  
Second, we show that changes in the U.S. investor base over time cannot explain the pre-listing 
run-up and post-listing decline associated with cross-listing on a U.S. stock exchange. Canadian 
firms cross-list following a run-up in their valuation that begins three to five years prior to cross-
listing. Valuations peak in the year of cross-listing and fall monotonically thereafter. Firms that 
attract the greatest number of U.S. institutional  investors benefit most initially; yet, even these 
firms are valued no differently than non-cross-listed firms within several years of cross-listing. 
Any increase in valuation associated with higher investor recognition is temporary, and  
the valuation premium of these firms returns to their pre-listing levels by the third year post-
cross-listing.  
Third, we show that a widening of the shareholder base, as predicted by Merton’s (1987) 
hypothesis, and an improved information environment are separate effects. Canadian firms with 
a controlling shareholder holding 20 per cent or more of the votes and a single share class are 
valued similarly to widely held firms. Firms that use dual-class shares to separate cash-flow from 
control rights, however, are valued at a discount to widely held firms, suggesting that the agency 
conflicts between minority and controlling shareholders are acute for these firms. For this reason, 
we expect that firms with dual-class shares should experience the greatest valuation benefit from 
cross-listing. The evidence supports this conjecture.  We find that the  relative  increase in 
valuation is greatest for firms with dual-class shares. While this effect cannot be distinguished 
when investor recognition is high, it is visible at low levels of investor recognition. Firms with 
dual-class shares benefit more even when they attract few or no U.S. investors. This valuation 
increase despite a failure to widen the shareholder base is c onsistent with a reduction of 
information asymmetry between controlling and minority shareholders. Thus, an improvement  
in the firm’s information environment is important for firms where agency problems are  
most acute. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops hypotheses based on a 
Merton’s investor recognition hypothesis, and describes the literature on concentrated ownership 3 
and firm valuation. Section 3 describes the data and methodology, and presents descriptive 
statistics of our sample. Section 4 presents the empirical results. Section 5 concludes.  
2.  Development of Hypotheses  
The impact of cross-listing on a foreign stock exchange is a much-researched phenomenon 
(Karolyi 1998, 2006). While studies have generated a number of explanations for the benefits of 
cross-listing, there is little consensus on what effect dominates. The evidence in the literature 
suggests three main drivers: increased liquidity as the foreign firm’s shares become more 
accessible to U.S. investors (the liquidity hypothesis); increased investor recognition associated 
with a widening of the cross-listed firm’s shareholder base and an improvement in its 
information environment (the investor recognition hypothesis); and reduced information 
asymmetry between controlling and minority shareholders, owing  to greater monitoring and 
transparency (the bonding hypothesis). In this paper, we focus on the investor recognition and 
bonding hypotheses, while controlling for the impact of increased liquidity.
2 This section 
develops hypotheses related to each of these explanations separately, which we first test 
separately and then jointly in the third section.  
2.1  Merton’s (1987) investor recognition hypothesis 
Merton (1987) modifies the Sharpe-Lintner capital-asset-pricing model to include a factor, the 
‘shadow cost of information,’ that p roxies for incomplete information about the securities 
available for investment. The shadow cost of information is defined for stock i as  
   i i i i i q q x / ) 1 (
2 - =ds l ,  (1) 
where  d is the coefficient of aggregate risk aversion, 
2
i s is the firm-specific component of the 
stock’s return variance,  i x  is the market value of the firm relative to the market value of traded 
securities, and  i q  is the size of the firm’s investor base relative to the potential universe of 
investors. Another way to interpret  i q  is as the proportion of investors who are aware of the firm. 
The relationship between the shadow cost of information, i l , and the expected excess return of 
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2 Foerster and Karolyi (1999) and Mittoo (2003) provide comprehensive discussions of the liquidity 
hypothesis. 4 
where  ) (
*
i R E  is the expected excess return of the stock for the complete information case when 
all investors are aware of the security ( 1 = i q ), and  f R  is the return on the riskless security. The 
implication is that if the firm’s investor base increases, the shadow cost of incomplete 
information falls and observed returns should decline, on average. In the setting of cross-listing, 
the implication is that foreign firms that are either neglected or have a low number of investors 
will have an incentive to cross-list on a foreign stock exchange if this action will increase their 
overall shareholder base.  
Foerster and Karolyi (1999) test the hypothesis in a study of 153 firms from 11 countries that cross-
listed on a U.S. exchange from 1976 to 1992. The authors measure investor recognition by the change 
in the number of shareholders. They find that firms that cross-list experience an increase in their 
shareholder base by about 28.8 per cent, and that the firms experiencing the greatest increase in the 
number of shareholders exhibit a greater increase in stock price in response to the listing 
announcement. Baker, Nofsinger, and Weaver (2002) support this finding using media visibility and 
the number of equity analysts following a firm as alternative proxies for the level of investor 
recognition in a stock. They study 193 foreign firms that cross-listed on the NYSE and 179 firms that 
cross-listed on the London Stock Exchange between 1976 and 1996. Consistent with the investor 
recognition hypothesis, cross-listed firms experience an increase in media visibility and analyst 
following, both of which are associated with a decrease in the cost of equity capital after the listing. 
Lang, Lins, and Miller (2003) document a similar increase in analyst following, as well as an 
improvement in earnings forecasts, for firms that cross-list.  
Merton’s (1987) model focuses specifically o n the size of the firm’s investor base under 
incomplete information relative to the total investor base for the complete information case when 
all investors are aware of the security. One cannot directly observe, however, how many 
potential investors are aware of each firm. In this study we use two related proxies for investor 
recognition—the number of U.S. institutional investors holding the stock, and the proportional 
ownership by U.S. institutional investors of the stock—both measured post-cross-listing.
3 While 
these measures are imperfect proxies for investor recognition, it is reasonable to assume that they 
are highly correlated with investors’ awareness of the stock. Formally, our first hypothesis 
(stated in the null form) is: 
                                                 
3 While analyst coverage is an important proxy used in these studies, I/B/E/S data on analyst coverage of 
Canadian firms is limited to only a small sample (Leuz 2003). For this reason, we do not test this variable 
in this analysis. 5 
H1: The valuation premium of cross-listed Canadian firms relative to non-cross-listed Canadian 
firms is positively related to the level of investor recognition. 
This hypothesis implies a cross-sectional difference in valuation based on the holdings of  
U.S. investors. Implicitly, the increase in valuation is permanent. Although Foerster and Karolyi 
(1999) and Baker, Nofsinger, and Weaver (2002) examine the impact of investor recognition on 
stock returns around the cross-listing event, they do not examine its duration or longevity beyond 
a one-year horizon.  
Merton’s theory is a general-equilibrium relationship that predicts a permanent increase in 
valuation only if the actual level of investor holdings remains higher post-cross-listing, near the 
complete information case. Several studies provide evidence that suggests this effect may not be 
permanent. Foerster and Karolyi (1999) note that the cross-listed firms in their sample show 
positive abnormal returns during the year prior to the actual listing, followed by negative 
abnormal returns in the years following a U.S. listing. Since the focus of their study is on the 
short-term effects, Foerster and Karolyi (1999) do not explain this longer-horizon pattern, but 
they suggest that it may be due to changes in levels of investor recognition or liquidity. Mittoo 
(2003) studies this pattern directly in an event study of Canadian firms that cross-listed between 
1976 and 1998. She finds that Canadian cross-listed firms outperform the market by 30–40 per 
cent in the year prior to listing, but underperform the market by 13–30 per cent over the three 
years subsequent to listing. While liquidity gains are the major determinant of the short-run 
abnormal returns, Mittoo (2003) rules them out as an explanation of the longer-term 
performance, which she suggests is related to industry factors. Sarkissian and Schill (2004) 
provide further country-level evidence of this pattern in an event study of 764 firms from  
35 countries that were cross-listed as of 1998. They study the residual returns from market 
regressions for the 10 years before and after cross-listing, and find the same pre-listing run-up 
and post-listing decline.
4 Taken together, these empirical results do not support the prediction of 
permanent gains from Merton’s model. Hence, our second hypothesis focuses on the time-
varying effect of investor recognition: 
                                                 
4 Rather than testing the investor recognition hypothesis, Sarkissian and Schill (2004) focus on home bias 
and examine the impact on residual returns of country-level variables, such as the size of exports, industry 
structure, culture, and distance. They suggest that firms from countries that are relatively more familiar to 
foreign investors before the listing benefit most from the foreign listing. These authors do not measure 
investor recognition directly. The only firm-level characteristics in their model are firm size and a dummy 
variable classifying firms into tradable and non-tradable sectors. 6 
H2: The valuation premium of cross-listed Canadian firms relative to non-cross-listed Canadian 
firms in the years following cross-listing is associated with the level of investor recognition. 
This hypothesis focuses on the time-series properties of U.S. investor holdings on valuation. It 
implies that only firms that maintain a wider shareholder base will continue to exhibit a premium 
valuation. 
2.2  Ownership structure 
The investor recognition hypothesis suggests that all firms stand to benefit from the increased 
visibility and broader investor base associated with cross-listing. The evidence suggests, 
however, that ownership structure may qualify this prediction. Edison and Warnock (2004), 
Leuz,  Lins, and Warnock (2005), and Ferreira and Matos (2006) find that U.S. institutional 
investors avoid foreign firms that are controlled by a large blockholder. On the other hand, 
Ammer et al. (2005) find that the improvement in the availability and quality of value-relevant 
information about a firm is a key for determining which firms attract U.S. investment. They also 
find that U.S. investors show no reluctance to invest in countries with weak shareholder 
protection. Ownership structure is therefore an important variable conditioning any valuation 
gains from investor recognition. 
A second important dimension is the presence of two or more share classes with differential 
voting rights.
5 By separating cash-flow rights from voting rights, dual-class share structures 
allow controlling shareholders to escape the wealth consequences of their own decisions. This 
separation weakens their alignment with minority shareholders and potentially increases the risk 
of expropriation. Thus the incentives to indulge in wealth  diversionary behaviour or extract 
private benefits are higher in dual-class firms compared with  firms that have a one-share-one-
vote structure (DeAngelo and DeAngelo 1985; Grossman and Hart 1988).
6 This share structure 
may also affect the level of investor recognition, because a number of U.S. institutional investors 
are prohibited by charter from buying shares in firms with dual-class shares. Thus, our third 
hypothesis is: 
 
                                                 
5 Nenova (2003) reviews the literature on dual-class shares, and provides a rigorous analysis for 
measuring the private benefits of control.  
6 Attig (2005), Amoako-Adu and Smith (1995), and Jog and Riding (1986) document the widespread use 
of dual-class shares in Canada.  7 
H3: Cross-listed Canadian firms with concentrated ownership or dual-class shares have lower 
investor recognition than widely held firms. 
The bonding hypothesis suggests a different channel by which cross-listing can affect the 
valuation of firms with concentrated ownership. Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz (2004) look at the 
firm-level effect of a U.S. listing, as opposed to the country-level effect, owing to the increased 
legal protection of shareholders. They model the trade-off that controlling shareholders face 
when deciding whether to list on a U.S. stock exchange. By listing in the United States, the firm 
increases the quality and quantity of information available to minority shareholders, and reduces 
the extent to which controlling shareholders can engage in expropriation. On the benefits side, 
listing on a U.S. exchange provides financially constrained firms with access to capital, and 
increases the firm’s ability to take advantage of growth opportunities. Controlling shareholders 
will have an incentive to cross-list if the benefits that accrue to them of exploiting valuable 
growth opportunities exceed the costs of greater monitoring and lower consumption of the 
private benefits of control following cross-listing. This hypothesis is confirmed by Doidge et al. 
(2006), who find that firms with a large controlling shareholder are less likely to cross-list on a 
U.S. stock exchange, but that  when they do they experience an increase in valuation and a 
greater increase in analyst coverage than the average cross-listed firm. 
This bonding effect may be particularly important for firms where controlling shareholders use 
dual-class shares to separate cash-flow rights from control  rights. Doidge (2004) tests this 
relationship in an event study of 137 firms with dual-class shares from 20 countries that cross-list 
on a U.S. exchange. He finds that, while both share classes benefit from a U.S. listing, the 
minority share class benefits proportionately more as the voting premium between share classes 
narrows. The reduced premium, he argues, proxies for the greater protection offered to minority 
shareholders by a U.S. listing.
7 Doidge et al. (2006) note that firms with a separation of control 
and cash-flow rights have lower valuations, on average, but experience a greater increase in 
valuation when they cross-list on a U.S. stock exchange than do widely held firms.  
Given that bonding and investor recognition are both related to an improvement in the 
information environment of a firm, the bonding effect may be indistinguishable or completely 
subsumed by the investor recognition effect for most firms. The only case where the bonding 
effect may be isolated is for firms with acute agency conflicts that cross-list but fail to widen 
their U.S. shareholder base. In these cases, the effect of an improved information environment 
                                                 
7 Doidge (2004) does not consider whether this effect is related to investor recognition, and he does not 
look at the valuation of these firms. 8 
should dominate, since cross-listing would be predicted to reduce the information asymmetry 
between controlling and minority investors. Hence, our fourth and final hypothesis: 
H4: Cross-listed Canadian firms with concentrated ownership or dual-class shares will benefit 
more than widely held Canadian firms at low levels of investor recognition. 
Our  focus on the structure of ownership and the use of dual-class shares is related to Bris, 
Cantale, and Nishiotis (2005), who use an event study of 21 dual-class firms that list one of their 
share classes in the United States to disentangle competing cross-listing hypotheses. They find 
that improved liquidity and access to foreign investors are the most important effects, while the 
effects of improved investor protection are economically small. In our study we examine a 
broader group of firms—both firms that are closely and widely held and firms that are cross-
listed and not cross-listed—while controlling for liquidity effects. Our study is also related to 
Doidge et al. (2006), who find that foreign firms with concentrated ownership that cross-list on a 
U.S. exchange benefit more than widely held firms in terms of increased valuation and analyst 
coverage. Our study complements these studies, but controls for the legal environment and 
changing firm-level characteristics over time, including ownership structure, allowing us to focus 
on the firm-level effect.  
3.  Data 
We study Canadian firms over the 16-year period from 1989 to 2004. Canadian firms provide a 
unique experiment to investigate the relative impact of investor recognition and ownership 
structure on the valuation of cross-listed firms. First, focusing on one country controls for 
differences in country-specific factors. Canada is geographically close to the United States, 
shares the same time zone, has the same English common-law legal system, and offers similar 
levels of shareholder protection. Canadian accounting requires a similar level of disclosure as the 
U.S. GAAP.  Under the Multi-Jurisdictional Disclosure System put in place in 1991 (and 
amended in 1994), Canadian companies can satisfy their U.S. filing and disclosure requirements 
using their Canadian filings. Thus, a study of Canadian firms allows us to focus on firm-level 
factors while controlling for country-level factors. Second, Canadian firms cross-list using an 
ordinary share that is no different from the shares issued by U.S. companies.
8 Canadian and  
U.S. payments and settlement systems are linked, and the impact of currency movements on 
cross-listed shares is minimized through continuous arbitrage across markets. Third, Canadian 
                                                 
8 The exceptions are Canadian shares that are unregistered and trade over-the-counter on the National 
Quotation Bureau’s ‘pink sheets.’ We consider only exchange-listed firms in this study.  9 
firms make up the single largest group of foreign firms listed on U.S. stock exchanges, providing 
a large sample with considerable time-series and cross-sectional variation in firm-level 
characteristics. Fourth and most importantly, unlike the United States, where widely dispersed 
ownership is the norm, Canada has more concentrated corporate ownership with more large 
companies controlled by wealthy families, and more prevalent use of multiple classes of voting 
shares (Attig 2005; Morck, Stangeland, and Yeung 2000). This greater variation in ownership 
structure provides increased power for tests of the links between ownership structure and  
U.S. institutional holdings, while holding key country-level factors constant. 
We collect annual financial statement data from Canadian and U.S Compustat databases. Stock 
prices are collected from the CRSP and the TSX-Canadian Financial Markets Research Center 
(CFMRC) monthly databases. U.S. institutional ownership data for cross-listed  firms are 
obtained from the 13-F regulatory filings reported on the CDA/Spectrum database.
9 We identify 
cross-listed firms and the listing date using past issues of the TSX Review, news searches on 
Factiva, and data from U.S. stock exchanges. Data on the ownership of Canadian firms, as well 
as the relative size of cash flow and control stakes, are collected from annual management proxy 
circulars and annual issues of the Financial Post Top 500.
10  
The full sample consists of all Canadian firms that meet the f ollowing criteria: positive assets 
(DATA6 on Compustat), positive book value of equity (DATA60), positive sales (DATA12), 
and non-missing income before extraordinary items (DATA18). Each firm in our sample must 
have at least two  years of consecutive sales  data and market value of equity. We exclude 
financial firms to make our sample comparable with other studies. Firms that delist due to a 
takeover, bankruptcy, or other reason are present in our sample until the year of delisting.
11 
These restrictions result in an initial sample size of 7,156 firm-year observations for 1,034 firms, 
of which 71 per cent are Canadian firms listed exclusively in the home market, and 29 per cent 
are Canadian firms listed on both a Canadian and a U.S. stock exchange.  
                                                 
9 Because there is no similar regulatory requirement in Canada for institutional investors to report their 
holdings, we do not have similar data for non-cross-listed Canadian firms. In addition, cross-listed firms 
for which there was no information in CDA/Spectrum are treated as having no U.S. institutional 
investors. 
10 Management proxy circulars are available electronically from 1997 onwards via the System for 
Electronic Document Analysis and Retrieval (SEDAR) at http://www.sedar.com. For years earlier than 
1997, we relied on the summer issue of the Financial Post magazine, which provides an analysis of the 
top 800 firms. It identifies the name and control stake of the ultimate owner, based on management proxy 
circulars. However, no data are available on dual-class shares.  
11 The issue of delisting is often overlooked in cross-listing studies. Witmer (2006) provides a study of 
this topic. 10 
To address the self-selection bias associated with the sample of cross-listed firms as well as the 
endogeneity of the cross-listing decision, we follow the cross-listing literature and construct a 
matched sample of non-cross-listed firms to better assess the impact of cross-listing on a firm’s 
valuation.
12 The sample is constructed using one-to-one matching (without replacement) of 
cross-listed firms with non-cross-listed firms based on year, firm size measured by total assets, 
and industry membership using the first two digits of the North American Industry Classification 
System (NAICS) codes.
13 We convert the total assets of Canadian firms to U.S. dollars using the 
end-of-year exchange rate, and restrict the sample to those firms where the ratio of the total 
assets of the matched firms is not greater (less) than 1.25 (0.75).  This process generates a 
matched sample of 2,802 firm-year observations for 683 firms, of which 277 firms are  
cross-listed. The observations are split evenly between cross-listed and non-cross-listed firms. 
Natural resource firms make up 38 per cent of the sample, followed by manufacturing and 
service firms at 30 per cent, high technology firms at 29 per cent, and transportation and utility 
stocks at 3 per cent.  
The valuation measure we use is Tobin’s q, which relates the market value of total assets to the 
book value of assets.
14 We measure Tobin’s q as of the end of the calendar year for all firms in 
our sample. Consistent with Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz (2004), we use the following control 
variables: future growth opportunities, firm size, profitability, and leverage. We use two proxies 
for future growth opportunities: past sales growth and the median Tobin’s q of a firm’s industry, 
where sales growth is computed as the two-year average growth rate  in sales.
15 Firm size is 
computed as the log of total assets. Profitability is measured by the return on assets (ROA), 
calculated as earnings before interest and taxes scaled by total assets. Leverage is calculated as 
total debt divided by total assets. Most importantly, we control for the liquidity in a firm’s 
shares. Firms that cross-list are expected to experience an increase in share turnover, as well as a 
tightening of bid-ask spreads, as more investors have access to the stock and stock exchanges in 
                                                 
12 Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd (1998) provide theoretical support for matching as an econometric 
technique for addressing endogeneity. Cross-listing studies that use matching include Baker, Nofsinger, 
and Weaver (2002), Claessens et al. (2002), Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz (2004), Errunza and Miller 
(2000), Lang, Lins, and Miller (2003), and Reese and Weisbach (2002).  
13 To avoid picking up part of the announcement effect of cross-listing, we ensure that the non-cross-listed 
firms used for matching are those firms that never cross-list over the sample period. 
14 Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz (2004), Lang, Lins, and Miller (2003) and Doidge et al. (2006) also use 
Tobin’s q to assess the impact of cross-listing. Following these studies, we compute Tobin’s q as the ratio 
of market value of equity plus book value of debt scaled by total assets. Both the numerator and 
denominator are denominated in the same currency. 
15 If the two-year growth rate is not available, one-year growth in sales is used. 11 
the home and U.S. markets compete for order flow (Karolyi 1998; Mittoo 2003). We capture this 
effect by including a measure of annual share turnover, measured as the annual trading volume 
divided by the number of shares outstanding, which includes shares traded in both the home and 
the U.S. markets for the cross-listed shares. We winsorize these variables at the 1 per cent and  
99 per cent levels to reduce the impact of outliers.  
Panel A of Table 1 provides summary statistics of the control variables used in this study. The 
cross-listed firms that are matched with non-cross-listed firms are comparable in terms of total 
assets, since the differences between the mean and median of  the cross-listed and non-cross-
listed firms are not statistically significant. The mean market value of the cross-listed firms is 
higher, although the difference in the median market value is not statistically different. 
Consistent with previous studies, cross-listed firms have significantly higher Tobin’s q ratios; the 
mean (median) r atio for the cross-listed firms is 1.783 (1.352), as compared with a  mean 
(median) for the non-cross-listed firms of 1.401 (1.199). The mean and median sales growth 
rates, 29 per cent and 12 per cent, respectively, are similar across both samples. The mean ROA 
of cross-listed firms is lower than that for non-cross-listed firms, but the median ROA is higher. 
The mean of share turnover, a proxy for liquidity, is higher for cross-listed firms than for non-
cross-listed firms, but the median is lower. Finally, cross-listed firms have a statistically lower 
leverage at both the mean and the median.  
We include another control variable in the regressions that relates to a firm’s information 
environment and trading characteristics.
16 We use a dummy variable to identify firms whose 
shares are included in the Toronto Stock Exchange 300 composite index (TSE300) for a given 
year.
17 Similar to the Standard & Poor’s 500 index in the United States, the TSE300 index (later 
the S&P/TSX composite index) identifies the largest Canadian firms by market capitalization in 
a given year. Firms in the index benefit from increased visibility, a wider Canadian shareholder 
base, and greater trading activity, since many classes of investors, such as passive index funds, 
hold the shares in this index. The TSE300 and its successor do not restrict firms based on 
ownership structure, and firms with dual-class shares represent around 20 per cent of the firms in 
the index, on average. By including this variable, we control for a firm’s investor recognition in 
the home market, in order to identify the increase in investor recognition due to the U.S. listing. 
                                                 
16 Ferreira and Matos (2006), for example, find that U.S. institutional investors prefer the shares of firms 
that are part of the Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI) All Country World Index. A large 
literature looks at how inclusion in the S&P500 index affects trading behaviour. Chen, Noronha, and 
Singal (2004) provide references to this literature. 
17 The TSE300 index was replaced by the S&P/TSX composite index in May 2002, at which time the 
number of firms was reduced to remove smaller, more illiquid firms. 12 
This dummy variable has a 60 per cent correlation with firm size, a negative 1  per cent 
correlation with share turnover, and is orthogonal to the decision to cross-list in our sample.
18  
Panel B of Table 1 shows the frequencies of the different types of ownership structures.
19 
Following La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (1999), and subsequent studies on ownership 
stakes, we focus on the 20 per cent threshold, and treat firms that have a control stake below  
20  per cent, or no control stake, as widely  held. The literature on concentrated ownership 
suggests that intermediate stakes decrease firm value due to entrenchment effects, but larger 
stakes increase firm value due to greater incentive effects (Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny 1988; 
Claessens et al. 2002). But the use of mechanisms that separate cash-flow rights from control 
rights reduces the incentive effects and increases the risk that controlling shareholders will 
consume private benefits. To highlight these opposing effects, we distinguish between firms with 
a control stake of 20 per cent or more that feature a single share class (labelled Control 20%+), 
and firms with dual-class shares that—with few exceptions—have a control stake of 20 per cent 
or more (labelled Dual-class shares).
20 We therefore focus on three mutually exclusive groups of 
firms based on ownership structure: widely held firms, firms with a blockholder of 20 per cent or 
more and a single share class, and firms with a dual-class share structure.  
Panel B reveals considerable variation in the ownership structure of cross-listed and non-cross-
listed firms. Specifically, while 61.6 per cent of the cross-listed firms are characterized as widely 
held, only 40.8 per cent of the non-cross-listed firms are widely held. This finding is consistent 
with the predictions of Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz (2004) that firms with a controlling 
shareholder are less likely to cross-list. In particular, only 28.3 per cent of the cross-listed firms 
have a control stake of 20  per cent or greater, compared  with  39.5  per cent  for the non- 
cross-listed sample, and only 10.1 per cent of the cross-listed firms have dual-class shares, as 
compared with 19.7 per cent of the non-cross-listed firms.  
                                                 
18 Part of the rationale for the reconstruction of the TSE300 index into the S&P/TSX composite index was 
to remove illiquid firms. 
19 In a sensitivity analysis, we examine whether the type of blockholder affects the results. We distinguish 
between firms controlled  by a family/management group, a widely held corporation, or a widely held  
financial institution (such as a bank, mutual fund, or pension fund). Our results suggest that owner types 
do not have an impact on the results.  
20 Less than 4 per cent of observations of dual -class share firms have control stakes below 20 per cent; 
less than 1 per cent have control stakes below 10 per cent. 13 
Panel C presents statistics on the wedge between voting rights and cash-flow rights for the firms 
that have dual-class shares, where exact data on these ratios are available.
21 While Claessens et 
al. (2002) focus on the absolute difference between control and cash-flow stakes, Lins (2003) 
and Lemmon and Lins (2003) use the ratio of control to cash flow (which they term cash-flow 
leverage). The absolute difference for both cross-listed and non-cross-listed firms is around  
36.7  per cent, and the difference between the mean (median) of the two samples is not 
statistically different. When using the ratio of control to cash  flow, the picture is somewhat 
different, since the mean (median) for non-cross-listed firms is 6.8x (3.0x) leverage, while the 
mean (median) for cross-listed firms is 3.7x (2.1x) leverage. The difference in the means is 
statistically different, but the difference in the medians is not. Overall, these statistics suggest 
that there is no significant difference in the wedge between the cross-listed companies and non-
cross-listed companies with dual-class shares for this sample.
22  
Panel D provides univariate tests of the difference in the mean (median) Tobin’s q ratio by type 
of ownership structure. Widely  held  firms that are cross-listed have the highest absolute 
valuations, with a mean (median) Tobin’s q of 1.868 (1.424). This mean (median) is significantly 
higher than the mean (median) of non-cross-listed firms of 1.480 (1.260). This difference 
represents a premium of 26 per cent (13 per cent). The difference in the mean Tobin’s q between 
cross-listed firms and non-cross-listed firms is 0.272 for Control  20%+ firms (a premium of  
19 per cent), and 0.286 for dual-class firms (a premium of 25 per cent). Hence, it appears that all 
cross-listed firms are traded at a premium relative to non-cross-listed firms, regardless of the 
control structure. Notice that the dual-class firms have the lowest mean (median) valuations 
relative to widely held and Control 20%+ firms. This difference is statistically significant for 
both non-cross-listed and cross-listed firms. This univariate evidence is consistent with dual-
class share firms having the most acute agency problems. 
Looking at the cross-listed firms only, widely  held firms have a small but economically 
important valuation premium over  Control  20%+ firms. The mean (median) premium is  
8 per cent (16 per cent) and is statistically significant at the 10 per cent (1 per cent) level. The 
                                                 
21  Cash-flow and ownership rights are calculated from a firm’s management proxy circulars. These 
circulars are available electronically from 1997 onwards. We are not able to find accurate data for earlier 
years. 
22 We use both of these variables in the regressions that follow, but find that the coefficients are not 
statistically significant, because of the low variation between cross-listed and non-cross-listed firms. We 
therefore use a simple dummy variable to identify firms that have dual-class shares in the tables in this 
paper (alternative results are available upon request). 14 
mean (median) premium of widely held firms over firms with dual-class shares is much larger, at 
31 per cent (21 per cent), and is statistically different at the 1 per cent level for both statistics.  
Panel E provides a preview of our results when controlling for the degree of widening of the  
U.S. investor base. We divide the cross-listed firms into two groups based on the number of  
U.S. investors that hold the stock in each year following cross-listing. INUMHI (INUMLO) 
takes the value of 1 if the firm is cross-listed and the number of U.S. institutional investors is 
greater (lower) than the median number of institutional investors, and zero otherwise. Notice that 
the valuations of cross-listed firms identified by INUMLO and INUMHI are statistically higher 
at the mean (median) than the non-cross-listed firms, as determined using a t-test (sign rank test). 
But also notice that the cross-listed firms that attract more than the median number of  
U.S. investors have the highest valuations, consistent with Merton’s (1987) investor recognition 
hypothesis. Finally, note the rank ordering in valuations across all three groups, with widely held 
firms exhibiting higher valuations than Control 20%+ firms, and Control 20%+ firms exhibiting 
higher valuations than Dual-class firms.  
These univariate findings are suggestive, but the comparisons do not control for firm-specific 
characteristics and other factors. The next section uses multivariate regressions to distinguish 
these effects.  
4.  Results 
4.1  Cross-sectional analysis of investor recognition and valuation 
Tables 2 and 3 show regression results of the relationship between investor recognition and 
cross-listing. The regressions are estimated using panel data with fixed effects, including year 
dummies. We estimate the regressions using fixed effects to capture a firm-specific effect that is 
random across firms but time-invariant for a given firm.
23 We are able to use other dummy 
variables due to the variation across time. For example, our sample includes over 120 firms that 
first cross-list over our sample period, 10 firms that either adopt or eliminate a dual-class share 
structure, and 82 firms with a single-share class that either become controlled at the 20 per cent 
level or become widely held. The coefficients of the year dummies are suppressed for purposes 
of exposition.  
Column 1 of Table 2 presents the base regressions of the effect of cross-listing on valuation, 
proxied by Tobin’s q. All the coefficients are significant at the 1 per cent level. Consistent with 
                                                 
23 A Hausman test rejects the random-effects specification, although the direction and relative size of the 
coefficients are similar using random effects (results available upon request). 15 
prior research, sales growth and industry q are positive, indicating a positive association between 
Tobin’s q and growth opportunities. The coefficient on ROA is positive, suggesting  that 
profitability is positively associated with higher valuations. The coefficient on the log of assets is 
negative, consistent with the size effect, while the coefficient on leverage is negative but not 
significant. Share turnover is positive but not significant. Membership in the TSE300 index is 
positive and significant, consistent with greater visibility being positively associated with 
valuation. More importantly, the coefficient on XLIST, a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm 
is cross-listed and zero otherwise, is positive (0.318) and statistically significant at the 1 per cent 
level, indicating that cross-listed firms enjoy a higher valuation than non-cross-listed firms. This 
finding is consistent with the ubiquitous evidence in the cross-listing literature (Karolyi 1998, 
2006).  
Columns 2 through 7 of Table 2 test the hypotheses linking the valuation premium of cross-listed 
firms with investor recognition. We use two proxies for investor recognition: the log of the 
number of U.S. institutional investors (INS_NUM) and the percentage ownership of  
U.S. institutional investors (INS_HOL). Bushee (1998), among others, finds t hat there is 
potential endogeneity between the investment decision by institutional investors and Tobin’s q, 
because institutional investors tend to hold firms that have higher valuations. We therefore 
estimate the regressions using two-stage least squares. In the first stage, we instrument for the 
number or percentage holdings of U.S. investors, and use the predicted values in the second-
stage regressions. Columns 2 and 5 report the first-stage estimates (using panel regressions with 
fixed effects) of INS_NUM and INS_HOL, respectively, using as instruments both the control 
variables from column 1 and other factors identified in the literature that explain the holdings of 
U.S. institutional investors (see Frieder and Subrahmanyam 2005; Dahlquist and Robertsson 
2002; Bushee 1998). These other factors are: a dummy variable (Loss) set equal to 1 if the firm 
reports negative earnings, and zero otherwise; research and development (R&D) intensity, 
measured as R&D expense divided by total sales; dividend yield, measured as dividends paid on 
common stock divided by market value of common equity; and a dummy variable for capital 
raising set equal to 1 if the firm raises capital in the United States at or subsequent to cross-
listing, and zero otherwise.  
The results in  column 2 suggest that INS_NUM is positively associated with firm size, 
membership in the TSE300 index, and capital raising, and negatively associated with leverage 
and share turnover. These results are consistent with prior studies, except for the direction of 
share turnover. Column 3 provides the second-stage regressions, where we include the predicted 
value of INS_NUM. The coefficients on the control variables are very similar to the base 16 
regression in column 1, although share turnover is now statistically significant, consistent with 
liquidity having a distinct effect on valuation from the amount of U.S. institutional ownership. 
The coefficient on the predicted INS_NUM is positive but not significant, contrary to the 
predictions of our first hypothesis (H1). The XLIST dummy is still positive, but no longer 
significant. There is clearly some interaction between cross-listing and institutional ownership 
that is not identified in this specification. 
In column 4 we replace the XLIST dummy with two dummy variables identifying cross-listed 
firms in the lower and upper halves of INS_NUM for any given year. Specifically, INUMHI 
(INUMLO) takes the value of 1 if the firm is cross-listed and the number of U.S. institutional 
investors is greater (lower) than the median number of institutional investors, and zero otherwise. 
The coefficient on INUMHI is strongly positive and significant, suggesting that firms that attract 
more than the median number of U.S. investors have Tobin’s q ratios that are higher by 0.482 (or 
20 per cent) relative to the average firm in this regression. The coefficient on INUMLO (0.203) 
is not significant, indicating that the valuation of cross-listed firms that attract fewer than the 
median number of U.S. institutional investors is no different from firms that are not cross-listed. 
These results suggest that the valuation premium attributed to cross-listing is determined in part 
by the level of investor recognition. While cross-listed firms in general trade at a premium to 
non-cross-listed firms, the magnitude of the premium is positively related to the level of investor 
recognition.
24 Using this specification, we fail to reject our first hypothesis (H1). 
Columns 5 –7 replicate the results using our second proxy for investor recognition: the 
percentage ownership by U.S. institutional investors, INS_HOL. The results are similar to 
columns 2–4. In column 6, the coefficients on the XLIST dummy (0.199) and the predicted value 
of INS_HOL (1.073) are both positive and statistically significant. In column 7, the coefficient 
on the dummy variables for IHOLHI (0.356) is positive and significant, but the coefficient on 
IHOLLO (0.152) is not significant. Again the valuation of cross-listed firms that attract fewer 
than the median percentage holdings of U.S. institutional investors is no different from firms that 
are not cross-listed. Overall, the results of Table 2 suggest that cross-listed firms have a higher 
valuation than non-cross-listed firms, and that the valuation premium of cross-listed firms is 
positively associated with investor recognition.  
                                                 
24 As a sensitivity analysis, we estimate a regression including an interaction variable of XLIST and the 
predicted value of INS_NUM or INS_HOL. The coefficient on the interaction variable is positive and 
significant, consistent with the findings reported above. We conduct a similar analysis for the regressions 
that follow and obtain results similar to those reported. 17 
4.2   Time-series analysis of investor recognition and valuation 
The regressions in Table 2 show that the cross-sectional valuation premium of cross-listing 
depends in part on investor recognition, after controlling for firm-specific characteristics. These 
regressions do not capture the time-varying effect of cross-listing, since the dummy variables 
used—either the XLIST dummy or the interaction terms—identify the average effect for  
all cross-listed firms across all years. In this section, we address the time-varying dimension  
of investor recognition. We examine whether the effects of cross-listing on a firm’s valuation  
are permanent or temporary by including cross-listing dummy variables relative to the year of 
cross-listing.  
To motivate this analysis, Figure 1 shows the level of Tobin’s q for firms that first cross-listed on 
a U.S. exchange between 1990 and 2003.
25 We also restrict the sample period for each firm to 
the five years before and after cross-listing, or the event window [-5, 5]. Panel A of Figure 1 
shows a run-up in the mean (median) valuation, peaking in the year of cross-listing (XLIST 
year=0), followed by a decline in Tobin’s q in subsequent years. This pre-listing run-up and post-
listing decline is consistent with the findings in Foerster and Karolyi (1999), Mittoo (2003), and 
Sarkissian and Schill (2004), who show a similar pattern using abnormal returns, and Gozzi, 
Levine, and Schmukler (2005), who show this pattern using Tobin’s q.
26 Notice that the average 
firm appears to return to its pre-cross-listing Tobin’s q by year 3 after cross-listing, with a slight 
improvement over years 4 and 5. This picture suggests that the increase in valuation associated 
with cross-listing is time-varying, and appears to be largely transitory. While an announcement 
effect of cross-listing may explain part of the run-up close to the event, the outperformance 
begins from three years prior to cross-listing, suggesting that firms decide to cross-list following 
a period of strong performance.  
 Panels B and C of Figure 1 show the pattern based on U.S. investor holdings. We graph the 
average Tobin’s q for firms in the upper and lower halves of INS_NUM and INS_HOL. The 
graphs indicate that firms that attract either a higher number of U.S. institutional investors 
(INUMHI) or a higher percentage of  holdings by U.S. institutional investors (IHOLHI) almost 
double their valuations in the year of cross-listing relative to their valuation in the three years 
                                                 
25 These firms represent a subsample of the cross-listed firms in our matched sample, since some of the 
firms cross-listed prior to 1989, and so we do not capture the before-and-after effect of the cross-listing 
event. 
26 The results in Foerster and Karolyi (1999) correspond to the interval [-1,1] in Panel A of Figure 1, 
Mittoo (2003) to [-1,3], and Gozzi, Levine, and Schmukler (2005) to [-2,2]. Sarkissian and Schill (2004) 
examine the window [-10,10]. 18 
prior to cross-listing. However,  these firms also experience a sharp decrease in valuation 
subsequent to cross-listing. These patterns, while reinforcing the importance of investor 
recognition, suggest that most of the effect wears off over time.  
Table 3 presents regressions quantifying the valuation premium over time, using firms that first 
cross-listed between 1990 and 2003 matched with non-cross-listed firms. We focus on the period 
from the year of cross-listing until the fifth year following cross-listing, namely the interval 
[0,5]. In column 1, we repeat the base regression from Table 2. Although the sample is smaller, 
the coefficients of the controls have the same statistical significance and are of similar 
magnitude. A key difference is that the coefficient on the XLIST dummy (0.252) is no longer 
statistically significant, suggesting that this event does not increase the valuation of these firms, 
on average. In column 2 we include a dummy variable for each year subsequent to cross-listing 
relative to the year of cross-listing. For example, XLIST year 0 is the year of cross-listing, 
XLIST year 1 is the first year following cross-listing, and so on.
27 The regression results are 
consistent with the post-cross-listing decline in valuation shown in Figure 1, although the 
coefficients are not significant. The time-series effect does not show up as significant here, but  
is much stronger when the cross-listed firms are compared relative to their own history in  
section 4.4. 
In column 3 we create dummies of the interaction of the year relative  to cross-listing and 
INUMHI and INUMLO. The results suggest that firms with high institutional ownership 
(INUMHI) experience a large and statistically significant valuation increase in the year of cross-
listing (1.108), but that the valuation premium dissipates in the subsequent years. This valuation 
premium falls to 0.602 in year 1 and to 0.471 in year 2, at which time it is no longer statistically 
different from zero.
28 In contrast, the coefficients involving INUMLO are not statistically 
significant, suggesting that cross-listed firms that fail to attract higher than the median number of 
U.S. investors do not exhibit statistically higher valuations from cross-listing.  
Column 4 replicates the analysis in column 3 with our second proxy for investor recognition, 
INS_HOL. The results are similar. Specifically, column 4 shows that the coefficients on the 
dummies for the interaction between IHOLLO and XLIST are not significant. However, for high 
levels of investor recognition, there is a valuation premium in the year of cross-listing (0.611), 
                                                 
27 To conserve space, we group years 3, 4, and 5 under one dummy variable. When we include a separate 
dummy variable for years 3, 4 , and 5, the coefficients decline in magnitude, and are not statistically 
different from zero. 
28 Untabulated tests show that these coefficients are statistically different from each other in y ear 0 and 
year 1, and in all other years relative to year 0. 19 
but the premium decreases monotonically in the years post-cross-listing. The interaction is not 
statistically significant in any of the other years, suggesting that the valuation of these firms is no 
different from firms that attract fewer than the median proportional holdings of U.S. investors, 
on the one hand, or a matched sample of firms that do not cross-list, on the other. Crucially, the 
impact of investor recognition on Tobin’s q wears off within one year of cross-listing.  
Overall, the results suggest that the valuation premium attributed to cross-listing is decreasing 
monotonically in the years post-cross-listing. In fact, cross-listed companies are not valued at a 
premium relative to non-cross-listed companies as of the second year post-cross-listing. The 
results provide partial support to the second hypothesis (H2) that the valuation premium of cross-
listed Canadian firms relative to non-cross-listed Canadian firms is conditional on maintaining a 
high level of investor recognition. Specifically, we find that firms that are able to capture high 
investor recognition enjoy a valuation premium at the time of cross-listing, although the 
valuation premium decreases monotonically and dissipates quickly. In contrast, cross-listed firms 
that do not broaden their U.S. investor base have similar valuations to non-cross-listed 
companies. While these results provide further support to the importance of investor recognition, 
they indicate that the impact of a wider U.S. investor base on valuations is transitory and does 
not lead to higher valuations that persist over time.  
4.3  Investor recognition and valuation conditional on ownership structure 
The analysis in Tables 2 and 3 considers the effect of investor recognition on a cross-listed firm’s 
valuation, without considering how agency problems between controlling and minority 
shareholders may condition the results. Tables 4 and 5 test how the investor recognition effect on 
valuation varies based on the ownership structure of the firm. In Table 4 we provide evidence on 
the cross-sectional relation between Tobin’s q, block holdings of 20 per cent or more, and the use 
of dual-class shares. In Table 5 we show the time-varying impact of investor recognition on 
Tobin’s q, controlling for ownership structure (that also varies over time).  
Column 1 in Table 4 presents the regression of Tobin’s q on the control variables and dummy 
variables for different ownership structures. Specifically, Control 20%+ takes the value of 1 if a 
blockholder owns 20 per cent or more of the voting shares outstanding in firms with a single 
share class, and zero otherwise. Dual-class is a dummy variable set equal to 1 if the firm has a 
blockholder that controls the firm through superior voting shares, and zero otherwise. Given that 
all firm-years are classified into the three categories of ownership structure (the third category  
is widely held), the base case in the regressions that follow is widely held firms. The coefficient 
on  Control 20%+ is not significantly different from zero, suggesting that there is no direct 20 
association between Tobin’s q and block holdings above 20 per cent.  The coefficient on  
Dual-class, by contrast, is negative and significant, indicating that firms with dual-class shares 
are valued at a discount relative to widely held firms. This finding is consistent with Claessens  
et al. (2002), Lins (2003), and Lemmon and Lins (2003),  who show a negative relationship 
between dual-class shares and firm value.  
In columns 2 and 3, we examine the interaction between cross-listing and ownership structure. 
Specifically, in column 2 we repeat the regression in  column 1, adding the XLIST variable. 
Consistent with the general finding in the literature, the coefficient on XLIST is positive (0.325) 
and statistically significant. In column 3 we interact the XLIST dummy with Control 20%+ and 
Dual-class, termed XLIST*control  20%+ and XLIST*dual-class, respectively, to examine 
whether the valuation premium changes with ownership structure. The coefficient on XLIST 
(0.303) is positive and significant, while the coefficients on XLIST*control 20%+ (-0.052) and 
XLIST*dual-class (0.377) are not significantly different from zero. Overall, the table shows that 
while all cross-listed firms are traded at a premium relative to non-cross-listed firms, the 
valuation premium across different categories of cross-listed firms is independent of ownership 
structure after controlling for other firm-specific characteristics. Yet, given that the valuation of 
dual-class firms is lower than that of  widely  held firms, firms with dual-class shares benefit 
proportionately more relative to other cross-listed firms.  
In Table 5 we consider how the impact of investor recognition varies cross-sectionally by 
ownership structure. Similar to Table 2, we control for potential endogeneity between Tobin’s q 
and the investments of U.S. institutional investors using two-stage least squares. Given the 
evidence that U.S. investors avoid foreign firms controlled by a large blockholder, we include 
the dummy variables Control 20%+ and Dual-class as additional instruments when predicting 
INS_NUM and INS_HOL. Column 1 presents results of the first-stage estimates of INS_NUM, 
using the same instruments as  in  column 2 of Table 2, in addition to the two dummies for 
ownership structure. The coefficients on the control variables are similar to those reported above. 
More importantly, the coefficient on  Control  20%+ ( -0.155) is not significant, while the 
coefficient on Dual-class (-1.151) is large, negative, and significant, indicating that INS_NUM is 
lower for firms that separate cash-flow from control rights. U.S. institutional investors avoid 
investing in firms where the alignment of interests between controlling and minority 
shareholders is low and the risk of wealth diversionary behaviour or expropriation is greater. 
Thus, we fail to reject the third hypothesis (H3), that the level of investor recognition following 
cross-listing is lower for firms with dual-class shares than for widely held firms, but we do reject 
this hypothesis for firms with controlling shareholders and a single share class. 21 
Column 2 of Table 5 presents the regression results of Tobin’s q on the control variables, 
dummies for ownership structure, predicted INS_NUM, and six dummies capturing the 
interactions between cross-listing, ownership structure, and  the  relative number of  
U.S. institutional investors. In these regressions, the dummy variables INUMLO and INUMHI 
capture the base case for widely  held cross-listed firms below and above the median 
for INS_NUM, respectively. X20_INUMLO and X20_INUMHI identify the interaction of 
Control 20%+ with INUMLO and INUMHI, respectively. XDC_INUMLO and XDC_INUMHI 
identify the interaction of Dual-class with INUMLO and INUMHI, respectively. Consistent with 
the evidence in Table 2, widely held cross-listed firms identified by INUMHI (0.521) have a 
premium valuation over non-cross-listed firms, while widely held cross-listed firms identified by 
INUMLO (0.125) have the same valuation as non-cross-listed firms. The coefficient on the 
dummy for the interaction of XLIST20 with INUMHI (-0.294) is negative and significantly 
different from zero, indicating that firms with blockholders of 20 per cent or more benefit less 
than other cross-listed firms identified by INUMHI. Dual-class firms identified by INUMHI are 
not statistically different from widely held firms in this category.  
Among cross-listed firms that fail to widen their U.S. investor base appreciably (INUMLO), 
firms with dual-class shares benefit more than  other categories of  firms. The interaction of 
XLISTdual-class with INUMLO, XDC_INUMLO, is positive (0.464) and significant. This result 
is important, because it suggests that dual-class firms are benefiting from cross-listing even when 
they do not widen their U.S. shareholder base appreciably. This finding is consistent with a 
bonding effect due to an improvement in the firm’s information environment. Firms with the 
greatest agency problems may benefit more from the greater monitoring and improved 
information environment following cross-listing than other firms, consistent with Doidge, 
Karolyi, and Stulz (2004), Lang, Lins, and Miller (2004), and Doidge et al. (2006).   
We check the robustness of these results using our second proxy for investor recognition, 
INS_HOL, in columns 3 and 4 of Table 5. Column 3 is the first-stage regression of the predicted 
level of INS_HOL. The results are very similar and confirm that firms with a blockholder of  
20 per cent or more benefit less when the proportional holdings of U.S. investors are high, while 
firms with dual-class shares benefit more when the proportional holdings of U.S. investors are low. 
Overall, the findings in Table 5 suggest that cross-listed Canadian firms with dual-class shares 
attract fewer U.S institutional investors but benefit more from cross-listing even when they fail 
to widen their shareholder base. These results suggest that, while any potential bonding effect 
may be indistinguishable or completely subsumed by the investor recognition effect at high 
levels of i nvestor recognition, there is evidence of a benefit from bonding at low levels of 22 
investor recognition for firms with agency problems between controlling and minority 
shareholders. We fail to reject the fourth hypothesis (H4) for firms with dual-class shares, but 
reject it for firms with a blockholder of 20 per cent or more and a single share class. 
4.4  Robustness using only firms that cross-listed between 1990 and 2003 
The analysis thus far is open to the criticism that it does not adequately address endogeneity in 
the decision to cross-list, because of the matching procedure. While matching cross-listed with 
non-cross-listed firms has been  used to control for endogeneity in a number of cross-listing 
studies (see footnote 12), critics may argue that the criteria used to create the matched sample are 
not the variables that explain the decision to cross-list. If this is the case, the results may not be 
robust if criteria other than size and industry membership are used to match cross-listed and non-
cross-listed firms.
29 We therefore check the robustness of our results by constructing our sample 
differently. Rather than comparing cross-listed firms with non-cross-listed firms, we compare the 
cross-listed firms against themselves by looking at their valuation before and after cross-listing.  
We identify all firms in our sample that cross-listed for the first time between 1990 and 2003. 
Firms that were cross-listed prior to 1990 are not included,  since we do not observe their 
valuation prior to cross-listing. We exclude firms that cross-list at the time of an initial public 
offering or firms that cross-list following a spinoff for the same reason. Finally, we exclude firms 
that are taken over or that delist within one year of cross-listing. These restrictions reduce our 
sample to 530 observations for 69 firms. The median firm is in the sample for 7 years, with a 
minimum of 3 years and a maximum of 11 years.  
Table 6 repeats the main results from Tables 2–5. Column 1 of Table 6 shows the regression of 
Tobin’s q on the control variables, the dummy variables for concentrated ownership, and an 
XLIST dummy. Consistent with our earlier findings, the coefficient on Control 20%+ (0.003) is 
not statistically significant, while the coefficient on D ual-class  (-1.052) is negative and 
significant, corroborating our finding that firms with dual-class shares are valued at a discount. 
The coefficient on XLIST (0.345) is positive and significant, indicating that post-cross-listing 
firms have a higher Tobin’s q, on average, than their valuations prior to cross-listing. While the 
interaction of XLIST and control 20%+ (-0.021) is not significant, the interaction of XLIST and 
Dual-class (0.690) is positive and strongly significant, confirming that, on average, firms with 
dual-class shares benefit more from cross-listing than other firms, consistent with our fourth 
hypothesis (H4).  
                                                 
29 The same criticism applies to methods used in other studies to control for endogeneity in the decision to 
cross-list. 23 
Column 2 of Table 6 tests the relationship between Tobin’s q and investor recognition. We report 
results using our first proxy INS_NUM, although the results with INS_HOL are similar. 
Consistent with Table 2, the coefficient on INUMHI (0.651) is positive and significant, 
indicating that firms that attract higher than the median number of U.S. institutional investors 
benefit from cross-listing. The coefficient on INUMLO (0.342) is weakly significant, indicating 
that firms that attract fewer than the median number of U.S. institutional investors also 
experience an increase in valuation from cross-listing. These results confirm our earlier finding 
that the valuation premium post-cross-listing is sensitive to the extent of investor recognition.  
Column 3 of Table 6 looks at the variation in a firm’s valuation over time relative to the year of 
cross-listing. Unlike the earlier analysis in Table 3, we can include dummy variables for the 
years prior to cross-listing, since we observe the cross-listed firms before and after cross-listing. 
We substitute the dummy XLIST in column 1 with dummy variables for the years relative to the 
year of cross-listing. We create dummy variables for the period three years and more prior to 
cross-listing (base case), two years prior to cross-listing (XLIST year -2), one year prior to cross-
listing (XLIST year -1), etc. The coefficients on these time-series dummy variables in column 3 
correspond closely to the graph in Panel A of Figure 1; they increase monotonically from two 
years prior to cross-listing to the year of cross-listing, and then decline monotonically. 
Specifically, Tobin’s q increases from 0.149 in XLIST year -1 to 0.603 in XLIST year 0, peaks 
at 0.655 in XLIST year 1, and then declines to 0.431 in XLIST year 2 and 0.352 in XLIST years 
3–5.
30 Unreported results show that the coefficient is no longer significant from XLIST year 4 
and onwards, suggesting that the average cross-listed firm returns to its pre-listing valuation 
within three years of cross-listing. The pre-listing run-up and post-listing decline confirm that the 
observed valuation premium post-cross-listing may not be related to cross-listing per se, but 
rather to other firm-specific factors.  
 In column 4 of Table 6, we examine the time-varying impact of investor recognition on the 
valuation premium, conditioned on whether a firm attracts more or less than the median number 
of U.S. investors in each year post-cross-listing. Similar to Table 3, we create dummies for the 
interaction between the year of cross-listing and INUMLO/HI. The coefficients on most years 
post-cross-listing for INUMLO are not statistically different from zero. The pattern for INUMHI 
is similar to the pattern documented in column 4 of Table 3, but more striking. Specifically, the 
coefficients on the years post-cross-listing decrease monotonically from 0.978 (statistically 
significant at less than 1  per cent) in the year of cross-listing to 0.318 (not statistically 
                                                 
30 Note that the dummy for the period of three years and more prior to cross-listing provides the base or 
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significant) by year 3 following cross-listing. These results confirm that the valuation premium 
post-cross-listing depends on investor recognition, but that the importance of investor 
recognition wears off within three years of cross-listing. 
The analysis in column 5 of Table 6 relates the valuation premium post-cross-listing to investor 
recognition and ownership structure. We repeat the regressions from Table 5, using dummies 
that capture the interaction of INUMLO/HI and Control 20%+ and Dual-class. Consistent with 
our earlier findings, the valuation premium of cross-listed firms with INUMHI (0.642) is 
significantly greater than zero, whereas the coefficient on INUMLO is not significantly different 
from zero. All firms that cross-list and attract a higher number of U.S. investors benefit, on 
average. Only the coefficient on the XLIST variable for firms with dual-class shares is positive 
and significantly different from zero. These results support our earlier finding that the benefits of 
the improvement in  the information environment are distinct from a widening of the U.S. 
shareholder base for firms with the greatest agency problems between controlling and minority 
shareholders.  
5.  Conclusion 
This study examines the cross-sectional and time-varying impact of investor recognition on the 
valuation of Canadian firms cross-listed on a U.S. exchange, conditional on ownership structure, 
liquidity, and other firm characteristics. We examine the change in Tobin’s q ratios of 277 
Canadian cross-listed firms over a 16-year period from 1989 to 2004. We show that increased 
valuations associated with greater investor recognition following a U.S. listing are temporary, 
not permanent. Consistent with the findings in Foerster and Karolyi (1999) and Baker, 
Nofsinger, and Weaver (2002), we find that the valuation of cross-listed Canadian firms 
increases with both the number and proportional holdings of U.S. institutional investors. But we 
show cross-sectionally that not all firms benefit from increased investor recognition following a 
U.S. listing. The firms that benefit most are the ones that are the most successful in broadening 
their U.S. investor base. Canadian firms that cross-list and attract few or no U.S. investors are 
valued no differently than non-cross-listed firms after controlling for firm characteristics.  
Using panel regressions, we examine the impact of greater investor recognition on a firm’s 
valuation over time. In contrast to the earlier studies, we find that the effects of greater investor 
recognition are temporary, not permanent. Even the Canadian firms that attract the highest 
number or proportional holdings of U.S. institutional investors experience a post-listing decline, 
with valuations that return to their pre-listing levels within three years of cross-listing. This result 
is robust when we benchmark cross-listed firms against a matched sample of firms listed 25 
exclusively in the home market, or when we examine the valuations of cross-listed firms before 
and after their U.S. listing. While the expansion of a firm’s U.S. shareholder base is a main factor 
associated with the increase of a Canadian firm’s increased valuation at the time of cross-listing, 
the benefit to a firm’s valuation from this effect is only transitory.  
We find evidence that an increase in a  firm’s shareholder base and an improvement in its 
information environment are distinct but related effects. We identify these effects by focusing on 
the impact of cross-listing across firms with different ownership structures. In particular, we 
compare firms that are widely held with firms that have a controlling shareholder and a single 
share class, on  the one hand, and firms that use dual-class shares to separate cash-flow from 
control rights, on the other. Firms with dual-class shares benefit relatively  more whether they 
succeed or not in expanding their U.S. shareholder base. This result is consistent with a  
U.S. listing improving a firm’s information environment and reducing the information 
asymmetry between controlling and minority shareholders for firms where the agency conflicts 
are most acute.   26 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
 
This table provides summary statistics for the matched sample of cross-listed and  non-cross-listed 
Canadian firms. Financial firms are not included. Firm-year observations  are matched without 
replacement based on two-digit NAICS industry codes and total assets measured in U.S. dollars. The final 
two columns show the difference between the mean (median) summary statistics across samples. Total 
assets are shown in U.S. dollars in millions, converted to U.S. dollars using the fiscal year-end exchange 
rate. Market value is total shares outstanding times price at calendar year-end. Tobin’s q is computed as 
(total assets + market value of equity - book value of equity) / total assets. Sales growth is the two-year 
average growth rate in sales. If two-year data are not available, one-year growth in sales is used. Return 
on assets is earnings before interest and taxes / total assets. Leverage is total debt / total assets. Panel B 
provides statistics on the ownership structure of the firms in the sample. Widely held are firms where no 
investor has a control stake of 20% or more in the voting shares. Control 20%+ are firms where an 
investor owns 20% of more of the voting shares. Dual-class are firms with two or more classes of voting 
shares with different levels of votes. Panel C provide statistics on the wedge between the percentage of 
control and percentage of cash-flow rights for dual-class shares firms. Panel D shows the mean and 
median Tobin’s q for the two samples across the different ownership structures. Panel E shows the mean 
and median Tobin’s q for the two samples where the cross-listed firms are divided into two samples based 
on their success in attracting U.S. institutional investors.  INUMLO (INUMHI) is a dummy equal to  
1 for cross-listed firms in the lower (upper) half of number of U.S. investors based on 13-F filings. 
Panel A: Mean (Median) summary  statistics 




  N  Mean  Median  N  Mean  Median  (t-test)  (sign rank) 
Total assets  1,401  995.0  270.7  1,401  959.0  263.3  -36.0   -7.4 
Market value  1,401  712.1  210.7  1,401  842.6  225.5  130.6**  14.8 
Tobin’s q  1,401  1.401  1.199  1,401  1.783  1.352  0.381***  0.153*** 
Sales growth  1,401  0.295  0.0121  1,401  0.288  0.118  -0.007   0.106 
Return on assets  1,401  0.014  0.0034  1,401  -0.036  0.016  -0.050***  0.013*** 
Leverage  1,401  0.277  0.268  1,401  0.251  0.221  -0.027***  -0.047*** 
Share turnover  1,395  0.116  0.015  1,397  0.174  0.012  0.058***  -0.003*** 
Notes: *, **, *** indicate significance level at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 1: continued 








Widely held   40.8  61.6  51.2 
Control 20%+ (ex dual-class)  39.5  28.3  33.9 
Dual-class shares  19.7  10.1  14.9 
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0 
 
Panel C: Separation between cash-flow and control rights for dual-class shares  







Control % minus cash flow % - mean (median)  36.7 (35.0)  35.6 (35.1)  -1.1  -0.1 
Control % / cash flow % - mean (median)  6.8 (3.0)  3.7 (2.1)  -3.1**  -0.9 
 
Panel D: Tobin’s q by ownership structure 
   Non-XLIST     XLIST 
   N  Mean  p50     N  Mean  p50 
Widely held  572  1.480  1.260     863  1.868***  1.424*** 
Control 20%+  553  1.454  1.225     396  1.726***  1.230 
Dual-class  276  1.135  1.043     142  1.421***  1.175** 
Note: Statistical significance of difference in mean (median) statistic based on t-test (sign rank test). *, **, *** indicate 
significance level at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
 
Panel E: Tobin’s q by ownership structure and level of U.S. institutional ownership 
  Non-XLIST     INUMLO     INUMHI 
   N  Mean  p50     N  Mean  p50     N  Mean  p50 
Widely held  572  1.480  1.260     445  1.663***  1.337*    418  2.087***  1.531*** 
Control 20%+  553  1.454  1.225     237  1.677***  1.150*    159  1.799***  1.389*** 
Dual-class  276  1.135  1.043     73  1.254**  1.071    69  1.598***  1.448*** 
Note: Statistical significance of difference in mean (median) statistic based on t-test (sign rank test). *, **, *** indicate 
significance level at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 2: Tobin’s q and Investor Recognition  
 
This table reports results of fixed-effects regressions that estimate the impact of cross-listing on Tobin’s q, 
controlling for investor recognition. The sample comprises cross-listed and non-cross-listed Canadian firms 
from 1989 to 2004. Firm-year observations are matched without replacement based on two-digit NAICS 
industry codes and total assets measured in U.S. dollars. Tobin’s q is computed as (total assets + market value 
of equity - book value of equity) / total assets. Log of assets is total assets in millions converted to U.S. dollars 
using the fiscal year-end exchange rate. Sales growth is the two-year average growth rate in sales. If two-year 
data are not available, one-year growth in sales is used. Industry q is the average Tobin’s q for an industry 
based on the two-digit NAIC code for a given year. Leverage is total debt / total assets. ROA is earnings before 
interest and taxes / total assets. Share turnover is annual trading volume / shares outstanding. TSE300 is a 
dummy set equal to 1 if the firm is a member of the TSE300 index, and zero otherwise. Loss is a dummy set 
equal to 1 for firms with negative earnings before extraordinary items. R&D intensity is research & 
development expense / sales. Dividend yield is the yield on common shares. Capital raising is a dummy set 
equal to 1 for firms that issue equity in the United States at or subsequent to cross-listing. XLIST is a dummy 
equal to 1 identifying cross-listed firm-years. Predicted # investors is the predicted value from column 2. 
INUMLO (INUMHI) is a dummy  equal to 1 for cross-listed firms in the lower (upper) half of # of  
U.S. investors based on 13-F filings. Predicted % U.S. investors is the predicted value from column 5. 
IHOLLO (IHOLHI) is a dummy equal to 1 for cross-listed firms in the lower (upper) half of % U.S. investors. 
*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. 
 
Dependent variable  Tobin’s q 
LOG(# US 
INVESTORS)  Tobin’s q  Tobin’s q 
% US 
INVESTORS  Tobin’s q  Tobin’s q 
Variable  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
Constant  2.226***  0.431  2.313***  2.342***  0.071  2.291***  2.342*** 
Log of assets  -0.298***  0.326***  -0.312***  -0.311***  0.028***  -0.318***  -0.322*** 
Sales growth  0.213***  -0.091  0.216***  0.212***  0.002  0.210***  0.212*** 
Industry q  0.517***  -0.147  0.519***  0.512***  -0.033*  0.532***  0.528*** 
Leverage  -0.170  -0.572**  -0.133  -0.131  -0.015  -0.141  -0.126 
ROA  0.814***  -0.009  0.844***  0.823***  0.006  0.835***  0.846*** 
Share turnover  0.057  -0.486***  0.082*  0.078*  -0.038***  0.089**  0.092** 
TSE300  0.171***  0.304***  0.153**  0.132**  0.034***  0.142**  0.138** 
Loss dummy    -0.128      -0.014     
R&D intensity    0.800      0.142**     
Dividend yield    -0.849      -0.106     
Capital raising    0.391***      0.042**     
XLIST  0.318***    0.200      0.199*   
Predicted # investors 
     (INS_NUM)      0.063  -0.003       
INUMLO        0.203       
INUMHI        0.482***       
Predicted % U.S.   
     investors (INS_HOL)            1.073*  0.641 
IHOLLO              0.152 
IHOLHI              0.356*** 
Year dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
N  2792  1381  2776  2776  1381  2776  2776 
Within R
2  0.120  0.212  0.123  0.129  0.137  0.124  0.128 33 
Table 3: Regressions on Firms First Cross-Listed between 1990 and 2003 
 
This table reports fixed-effect regressions on Tobin’s q using only firms that first cross-listed between 1990 
and 2003, matched with non-cross-listed Canadian firms. We consider observations only from the year of 
cross-listing (year 0) to the fifth year following cross-listing. The control variables are described in Table 2. 
XLIST year 0–5 are dummy variables identifying the year relative to cross-listing. Predicted # (%) of U.S. 
investors is the predicted absolute number (% holdings) of U.S. investors holding the cross-listed firm’s shares 
from Table 2. INUMLO (INUMHI) year 0–5 are dummy variables indicating whether a firm was in the lower 
(upper) half of # investors for each year relative to cross-listing. IHOLLO (IHOLHI) year 0–5 are dummy 
variables indicating whether a firm was in the lower (upper) half of % U.S. investors for each year relative to 
cross-listing. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. 
 
Dependent variable  Tobin’s q  Tobin’s q  Tobin’s q  Tobin’s q 
Variables  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Constant  2.423***  2.529***  2.397***  2.633*** 
Log of assets  -0.328***  -0.317***  -0.287***  -0.328*** 
Sales growth  0.258***  0.221***  0.252***  0.244*** 
Industry q  0.432***  0.421***  0.411***  0.412*** 
Leverage  -0.042  0.042  0.098  0.115 
ROA  1.290***  1.285***  1.306***  1.350*** 
Share turnover  0.050  0.069  0.048  0.074 
TSE300  0.189**  0.207**  0.145  0.170* 
XLIST  0.252       
XLIST year 0    0.245     
XLIST year 1    0.261     
XLIST year 2    0.166     
XLIST year 3-5    -0.015     
Predicted # investors (INS_NUM)      -0.072   
INUMLO year 0      -0.093   
INUMLO year 1      0.227   
INUMLO year 2      0.221   
INUMLO year 3-5      0.113   
INUMHI year 0      1.108***   
INUMHI year 1      0.602**   
INUMHI year 2      0.471   
INUMHI year 3-5      0.248   
Predicted % U.S. investors (INS_HOL)        0.102 
IHOLLO year 0        -0.077 
IHOLLO year 1        0.179 
IHOLLO year 2        0.152 
IHOLLO year 3-5        -0.058 
IHOLHI year 0        0.611*** 
IHOLHI year 1        0.315 
IHOLHI year 2        0.141 
IHOLHI year 3-5        0.039 
Year dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
N  1325  1325  1318  1318 
Within R
2  0.152  0.160  0.204  0.179 34 
Table 4: Impact of Ownership Structure on Tobin’s q 
 
This table reports results from fixed-effects regressions that estimate the impact of ownership structure on Tobin’s q 
using a matched sample of cross-listed and non-cross-listed Canadian firms from 1989 to 2004. Details on all variables 
can be found in Table 2. Control 20%+ is a dummy equal to 1 identifying control stakes of 20%+ where there is a one-
share, one-vote structure. Dual-class is a dummy equal to 1 for firms with two or more share classes with different 
voting rights. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.  
 
Dependent variable  Tobin’s q  Tobin’s q  Tobin’s q 
Variable  (1)  (2)  (3) 
Constant  2.451***  2.292***  2.317*** 
Log of assets  -0.291***  -0.299***  -0.300*** 
Sales growth  0.214***  0.214***  0.220*** 
Industry q  0.506***  0.508***  0.510*** 
Leverage  -0.175  -0.170  -0.167 
ROA  0.786***  0.804***  0.801*** 
Share turnover  0.053  0.056  0.055 
TSE300  0.192***  0.185***  0.186*** 
Control 20%+   0.015  0.047  0.074 
Dual-class  -0.529***  -0.509***  -0.696*** 
XLIST    0.325***  0.303*** 
XLIST*control 20%+      -0.052 
XLIST*dual-class      0.377 
Year dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes 
N  2792  2792  2792 
Within R
2  0.120  0.125  0.126 
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Table 5: Impact of Investor Recognition on Tobin’s q 
 Controlling for Ownership Structure 
 
This table reports results from fixed-effects regressions that estimate the impact of investor recognition on 
Tobin’s q using a matched sample of cross-listed and non-cross-listed Canadian firms from 1989 to 2004. 
Endogeneity in the holdings of U.S. institutional investors is addressed using two-stage least squares 
where the number and percentage ownership of U.S. institutional investors is instrumented in the first 
stage, and the predicted values are used in the second stage. Details on all variables can be found in Table 
2. Control 20%+ is a dummy equal to 1 identifying control stakes of 20%+ where there is a one-share, 
one-vote structure. Dual-class is a dummy equal to 1 for firms with two or more share classes with 




INVESTORS)  Tobin’s q 
% US 
INVESTORS  Tobin’s q 
Variable  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Constant  0.610  2.441***  0.078  2.430*** 
Log of assets  0.321***  -0.320***  0.028***  -0.329*** 
Sales growth  -0.107*  0.219***  0.002  0.215*** 
Industry q  -0.159  0.503***  -0.032*  0.526*** 
Leverage  -0.557**  -0.116  -0.015  -0.112 
ROA  0.004  0.810***  0.007  0.816*** 
Share turnover  -0.494***  0.089**  -0.038***  0.099** 
TSE300  0.288***  0.158***  0.033**  0.165*** 
Control 20%+ only  -0.155  0.102  -0.014  0.108 
Dual-class  -1.151***  -0.647***  -0.011  -0.657*** 
Loss dummy  -0.134    -0.014   
R&D intensity  0.853    0.138**   
Dividend yield  -1.140    -0.116   
Capital raising  0.396***    0.042**   
Share turnover  -0.494***  0.089**  -0.038***  0.099** 
Predicted # investors (INS_NUM)    0.012     
INUMLO    0.125     
INUMHI    0.521***     
X20_INUMLO    0.062     
X20_INUMHI    -0.294*     
XDC_INUMLO    0.464*     
XDC_INUMHI    0.100     
Predicted % investors (INS_HOL)        0.680 
IHOLLO        0.074 
IHOLHI        0.424*** 
X20_IHOLLO        0.100 
X20_IHOLHI        -0.321** 
XDC_IHOLLO        0.467* 
XDC_IHOLHI        0.059 
Year dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
N  1,381  2,776  1,381  2,776 
Within R
2  0.222  0.137  0.138  0.138 36 
Table 6: Regressions before and after Cross-Listing  
 
This table reports panel regressions on Tobin’s q using only the observations o f firms that first cross-
listed between 1990 and 2003. The variables are described in Tables 4, 5, and 6. *, **, and *** indicate 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. 
 
 
Dependent variable  Tobin’s q  Tobin’s q  Tobin’s q  Tobin’s q  Tobin’s q 
Variable  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Constant  3.131***  2.758***  2.615***  2.559***  2.797*** 
Log of assets  -0.447***  -0.409***  -0.342***  -0.339***  -0.398*** 
Sales growth  0.246***  0.280***  0.186**  0.230***  0.285*** 
Industry q  0.682***  0.713***  0.613***  0.647***  0.700*** 
Leverage  -0.765**  -0.954***  -0.950***  -0.923***  -0.881** 
ROA  1.496***  1.518***  1.473***  1.466***  1.470*** 
Share turnover  -0.119  -0.095  -0.136  -0.082  -0.093 
TSE300  0.345***  0.254*  0.333***  0.251*  0.280** 
Control 20%+  0.003  0.188  0.060  0.153  0.083 
Dual-class  -1.052***  -0.625**  -0.564**  -0.649**  -0.985*** 
XLIST  0.345**         
XLIST x Control 20%+  -0.021         
XLIST x Dual-class  0.690***         
Predicted # investors (INS_NUM)    0.005    -0.006  -0.029 
INUMLO    0.342*      0.222 
INUMHI    0.651***      0.642** 
XLIST year -2      0.048     
XLIST year -1      0.149     
XLIST year 0      0.603***     
XLIST year 1      0.655***     
XLIST year 2      0.431**     
XLIST year 3+      0.352*     
INUMLO year 0        0.050   
INUMLO year 1        0.407*   
INUMLO year 2        0.328   
INUMLO year 3+        0.281   
INUMHI year 0        0.978***   
INUMHI year 1        0.840***   
INUMHI year 2        0.517*   
INUMHI year 3+        0.318   
X20_INUMLO          0.307 
X20_INUMHI          -0.131 
XDC_INUMLO          0.676* 
XDC_INUMHI          0.449 
N  756  663  756  663  663 
Within R
2  0.189  0.198  0.188  0.220  0.206 37 
Figure 1: Change in Tobin’s q around Cross-Listing 
Panel A: Mean and Median Tobin’s q, All Firms 
 
Panel B: Low vs. High # U.S. Investors 
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